Dissertation Awards
12-20-2019

Essays in Labor and Public Economics
Giulia Giupponi
London School of Economics and Political Science

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/dissertation_awards

Essays in Labor and
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Giulia Giupponi
This thesis investigates the employment and welfare
effects of social insurance programs and minimum wage
policy.1 The first chapter provides new estimates of the
income effect of welfare transfers on individual labor supply.
Using administrative data on survivor insurance in Italy, and
quasi-experimental variation in the benefit amount received
by surviving spouses, I find that survivors fully offset the
benefit loss with increases in earnings. Extensive-margin
responses—in the form of increased labor-market entry at
younger ages and delayed retirement at older ages—are the
main driver of the earnings response. A revealed-preference
model demonstrates that large participation responses to realized benefit drops are revealing of large implicit valuations
of welfare transfers in the widowhood state.
The second chapter analyzes the employment and welfare
effects of short-time work programs (STW), which subsidize
hour reductions in firms affected by temporary shocks. The
analysis uses administrative data from Italy and quasiexperimental variation in STW policy rules to identify the
effects of STW on firms and workers, and on reallocation in
the labor market. STW has a large and significant negative
effect on hours, but large and positive effects on headcount
employment. However, these effects disappear once the
subsidy ends. Similarly, STW does not provide long-term
insurance to workers. Finally, STW has significant negative
reallocation effects on employment growth at the local labor
market level. A conceptual framework assesses the welfare
implications of STW and provides a general formula for the
optimal subsidy.
The third chapter investigates the impact of minimum
wages on firm behavior and the within-firm wage structure.
The analysis exploits the natural experiment of the National
Living Wage (NLW) introduction and matched employeremployee data on English care homes. No evidence of
adverse employment effects or firm closure is found. Rather,
homes bound more tightly by the NLW exhibit smaller
short-run improvements in the quality of care services. There
is strong evidence of positive wage spillovers onto younger
workers, but with no negative employment spillovers.
Employers’ preferences for fairness emerge as the most plausible explanation for the observed wage spillovers.
The fourth chapter investigates the nature of alternative
work arrangements in the U.K. labor market, placing a
particular focus on zero-hours contracts (ZHC). Combining
existing secondary data and newly collected survey data,
the analysis documents the importance and characteristics
of ZHC work. The chapter also explores the extent to which
higher minimum wages have potential to induce a larger
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utilization of alternative work arrangements by firms and,
consequently, a shift in the composition of their workforce
toward more flexible, but also insecure jobs. Minimum wage
increases are shown to have resulted in greater utilization of
ZHCs in the U.K. social care sector, and in low-wage sectors
more generally.

Chapter 1
When Income Effects Are Large: Labor Supply
Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
The effect of income on labor supply is a parameter of
great importance for both theory and policy analysis. From a
policy perspective, income effects are central to the evaluation of a broad set of policies involving income transfers,
such as social insurance programs, public pension schemes,
and tax policies. Income effects are also important for welfare analysis, since they are directly related to the marginal
utility of consumption (Chetty 2004, 2008).
In spite of their importance for economic analysis, we
still know surprisingly little about income effects, especially
in the context of tax and benefit programs. This is mostly
due to identification challenges: social insurance and tax and
transfer programs generally involve simultaneous changes in
income and work incentives, which make it hard to separately identify income and substitution elasticities. For this
reason, income effects have been typically assumed away
or calibrated. Most quasi-experimental estimates of income
effects are based on transfers that are either too modest to
trigger a response or relatively short-lived, implying that
observed responses may be substantially attenuated by optimization frictions (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Kimball
and Shapiro 2008; Marinescu 2018; Pencavel 1986). It is
therefore still unresolved whether existing estimates of
income effects are indeed capturing the true effects of income
on labor supply, especially in relation to welfare transfers.
In this chapter, I provide novel estimates of the income
effect of welfare transfers on individual labor supply. I
exploit a unique research setting in the context of the Italian
survivor insurance scheme, which provides a pension benefit
to surviving spouses of deceased retirees and workers. The
benefit is computed as a fraction of the deceased’s pension
and starts from the beginning of the month following the
death.2 I take advantage of a policy change that introduced
an exogenous, large and permanent discontinuity in the
fraction of the deceased’s pension received by survivors on
the basis of their spouse’s death date. Specifically, the reform
decreased the fraction of the deceased’s pension received
by survivors whose benefit started on or after September 1,
1995, generating a discontinuity in expected lifetime benefits
and de facto introducing two parallel benefit regimes of
exogenously different generosity that would then coexist for
a long time.
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Using newly released, rich administrative data on the
universe of survivor insurance payments and survivors’ contributory histories from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS), I implement a regression discontinuity
design in the spousal death date—which is equivalent to the
benefit start date— and compare the long-term outcomes of
otherwise identical individuals receiving benefits of different
generosity for a long time.3 The long-run identifying variation generated by the benefit reform offers a unique window
on the long-run behavioral responses to a permanent reduction in benefits, allowing to estimate long-run effects that are
plausibly not attenuated by short-run optimization frictions.
Also, by comparing treated and control individuals similarly
affected by the loss of a spouse, the identification strategy
implicitly accounts for state-dependent preferences.
I find that survivors fully offset the benefit loss by
increasing their earnings and, as a result, do not experience
any drop in disposable income. Specifically, in the 15 years
after a spouse’s death, survivors affected by the reform lose
on average €2,000 per year (a 21 percent drop relative to the
old regime). In response, they increase their average annual
earned income by a quantity equal to the benefit loss. This
translates into an estimated marginal propensity to earn out
of unearned income of approximately minus one.4 I document substantial heterogeneity in the income effect by the
relative severity of the benefit loss.
I probe the large income response by examining its underlying mechanisms. Labor force participation is the main
driver of the income response, in the form of increased labor
market entry by younger survivors and delayed retirement by
older survivors. Hours worked and the wage rate are found
to have a muted response to changes in the benefit. I uncover
interesting dynamic patterns in the participation response:
the latter is silent in the two years after the spouse’s death
and then grows steadily larger over time, reaching a differential of 18 percent after 15 years. The overall dynamic is
consistent with the notion that optimization frictions, such as
adjustment costs or—in the case analyzed—grief, attenuate
responses in the short run and fade away over time. I investigate program substitution responses as an additional margin
of adjustment.5 I find that survivor benefit reductions trigger
a statistically significant and economically sizable increase in
the take-up of paid family leave and unemployment insurance benefits.
Finally, I discuss the normative implications of my findings. In a simple revealed-preference framework, I demonstrate that survivors’ participation responses to a realized drop
in benefits reveal their implicit valuation of the benefit in the
widowhood state, as measured by the gap in the marginal
utility of consumption between the low-benefit
and high-benefit regime. Intuitively, the extent to which
individuals increase work effort in response to a drop in
unearned income reveals, ceteris paribus, the consumption
value that such lost income would have provided. Hence,
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larger responses must mean that the lost income is highly
valued and that there are large welfare gains from recouping
it. I estimate a marginal welfare gain from increased survivor
insurance generosity of 0.5, which implies that the marginal
utility of consumption is 50 percent higher among widow(er)s
in the low-benefit regime as compared to widow(er)s in the
high-benefit regime. This is in the higher end of the range of
existing estimates of the value of social insurance.
The findings in this chapter inform a long-standing line
of research on the income effect of welfare transfers on labor
supply.6 I contribute to this literature by providing wellidentified estimates of the income effect from a large and
permanent drop in unearned income, in the long term and in
the context of publicly provided benefits. This chapter is also
more broadly related to the literature on the labor supply and
program substitution effects of social insurance programs.7
It is also partly related to the literature on the divergence
between steady-state macro and micro elasticities of labor
supply.8 Finally, this chapter contributes to a growing body
of work that attempts to evaluate the welfare gains of social
insurance using empirically estimable “sufficient statistics.”9 I contribute to this literature by providing a simple
revealed-preference method based on within-state participation responses to benefit losses that allows for state dependence and is applicable to a broad class of public policies
involving income transfers.

Chapter 2
Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects of ShortTime Work Programs
(with Camille Landais)
The Great Recession has generated a significant revival
of interest in policies destined at encouraging labor hoarding
by firms during downturns (e.g., Giroud and Mueller 2017;
Yagan 2019). STW programs, which are subsidies for temporary reductions in the number of hours worked, are the most
emblematic of such policies and have been used aggressively
during the Great Recession, especially in European countries. The fraction of employees on STW in 2009 reached
7 percent in Belgium, close to 5 percent in Germany, and 4
percent in France.10 In Italy, according to social security data,
4.6 percent of the workforce was in STW in 2013, for a cost
of 0.5 percent of GDP. This revival of interest is also palpable in the United States, where state STW programs have
been actively promoted by the Job Creation Act of 2012. In
2016, more than 28 U.S. states had implemented their own
STW programs.11
But what is behind this STW craze? Do we know that
it is effective in stabilizing employment? Is it an effective
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way to provide insurance to workers? More effective than
unemployment insurance, for instance? More fundamentally,
do we know anything about its welfare implications? What
sources of inefficiencies are we trying to correct with STW?
If we believe that hours or employment are not optimally set
in the labor market, how can STW deal with these inefficiencies? Are we not creating additional inefficiencies with these
programs by keeping workers in unproductive firms, preventing an efficient reallocation of labor?
Despite STW being a key element to the countercyclical
policy tool kit, and one of the main active labor market policies during downturns, we are completely at a loss to answer
these fundamental questions. This is due to three simple
reasons: 1) a critical lack of firm- or individual-level administrative data on STW;12 2) even in the presence of firm-level
data, the lack of credible sources of identification of STW
treatment;13 and 3) the lack of a simple, tractable yet general
conceptual framework to rationalize the empirical evidence
and feed the estimates back into a welfare evaluation of STW
policies.14
This chapter contributes to our understanding of STW by
addressing these three limitations. It relies on uniquely rich
administrative data on STW from Italy. It uses variation in
eligibility rules across firms to provide compelling evidence
of the causal impact of STW on firms’ and workers’ outcomes. And it offers a simple and general conceptual framework that maps onto our empirical results to transparently
assess the welfare consequences of STW programs.
Our data come from the INPS and cover the universe of
Italian employer-employee matches in the private sector and
the universe of all social security and transfer payments in
Italy from 1983 to 2015. Besides granular information on
firms and workers’ histories, it provides detailed information
on eligibility, applications, and authorizations of the universe of STW episodes at both the firm and individual levels
from 2005 to 2015. Identification stems from the interaction
between two sources of variation in eligibility: INPS codes
and firm size. First, we exploit the fact that within five-digit
industries, certain firms, defined by particular INPS codes,
are eligible while others are not, as per the implementation by INPS of STW legislation dating back to the 1970s.
Second, we use the additional requirement that firms must
be above a certain size threshold to be eligible. This enables
us to test and control for the possibility that differential time
shocks affected eligible and noneligible INPS codes within
five-digit industries during the recession. We provide multiple robustness checks for the validity of our approach.
Our results demonstrate that STW has large and significant effects on firms’ employment at both the intensive and
extensive margin. Compared to counterfactual firms, firms
treated by STW experience a 40 percent reduction in hours
worked per employee, and a similar magnitude increase
in the number of employees in the firm, with no discernible effect on wage rates. We show that these employment
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effects are temporary and immediately disappear once STW
treatment stops. On the workers’ side, we similarly find that
treatment effects are all concentrated in the short run. STW
has immediate positive effects on employment probability,
but negative effects on hours, and a positive effect on total
earnings and transfers. But these effects disappear after
treatment, so that STW provides no significant insurance to
workers in the medium or long run. In fact, two years after
treatment, there are no significant differences in the employment probability, earnings, and total income of workers who
were treated by STW and workers who were counterfactually
laid off.
We then analyze the selection of firms into STW and the
heterogeneity in the treatment effects of the program. We
show that firms that were at the bottom of the productivity
distribution before the recession are three times more likely
than higher-productivity firms to take up STW during the
recession and that employment effects for them are significantly smaller. This suggests that STW is predominantly
targeting firms that have permanently lower productivity and
helps explain why STW does not entail long-term benefits.
More importantly, this suggests that by keeping workers in
low-productivity firms, STW may have significant negative
reallocation effects in the labor market.
To investigate these claims, we leverage the rich spatial
variation available in Italy across more than 600 local labor
markets and estimate how an increase in the fraction of
workers on STW in a local labor market affects employment
in nontreated firms. We instrument variation in the intensity
of STW treatment across local labor markets by the average
yearly fraction of eligible workers in the local labor market
in the prerecession period, controlling for a rich set of firm
and local labor market characteristics. Our results provide
compelling evidence of the presence of equilibrium effects
of STW. STW significantly decreases employment growth
and inflow rates in nontreated firms, and has a significant
negative impact on total factor productivity growth in the
labor market.
We finally provide a tractable search and matching framework that rationalizes these empirical findings and maps our
estimates into a transparent welfare evaluation of STW. Our
model is directly related to the public finance literature on
optimal policies in equilibrium models of the labor market (see, for instance, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2018;
Michaillat and Saez 2019). The main insight is that optimal
STW not only balances the insurance value of the subsidy
with its fiscal externality but also needs to account for two
additional sources of inefficiencies: 1) employment may be
inefficient because of the frictional nature of the labor market, and 2) equilibrium hours may also not be at their socially
optimal level due to the missing market for hours. STW will
entail positive welfare gains when equilibrium employment
is suboptimally low and hours suboptimally high, and our
formula offers a clear representation of these terms.
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Our approach offers the possibility to conduct a local
welfare calibration using our reduced form estimates, which
suggests that, in the current Italian context, the marginal
welfare gains of further increases in STW are small. Finally,
we use a calibrated version of the model to run nonmarginal
counterfactual analysis and quantify the welfare effects of
removing STW. This analysis confirms that the welfare gains
of further increases in the generosity of STW are small, but
the value of having STW is significantly positive. We also
use the calibrated model to show that the immediate employment effects of STW are significantly larger when the aggregate shock is temporary than when it is permanent, as firms’
desire to hoard labor is greater for temporary shocks.

Chapter 3
Changing the Structure of Minimum Wages:
Firm Adjustment and Wage Spillovers
(with Stephen J. Machin)
The by-now centennial history of minimum wages and
their widespread application across developed and developing countries has triggered a great deal of academic research
and policy discussion on the topic. Recent years have seen
a burst of renewed interest in minimum wage policy. In this
chapter, we study the effect of a substantive change in the
U.K. minimum wage structure on firm behavior and the
within-firm wage structure. The change occurred when in
July 2015 the newly elected Conservative Party government
unexpectedly announced the introduction of the National
Living Wage (NLW). This altered the structure of U.K.
minimum wages by introducing a new minimum wage rate
of £7.20 an hour for workers aged 25 or above starting April
2016, while leaving the minimum wage rates for younger
workers unchanged.
We are interested in analyzing the consequences of this
change on three main areas that have been traditionally
explored in the minimum wage literature. Firstly, wage and
employment effects are studied in the context of workers and
firms in the U.K. care home sector, which has been argued
to be a good testing ground for evaluating minimum wage
effects on employment in earlier research (Machin, Manning,
and Rahman 2003; Machin and Wilson 2004). Secondly,
we exploit the age-related change in minimum wage rates
to study whether the NLW induced wage or employment
spillovers onto workers under 25. Thirdly, we explore the
possibility that care homes responded to the wage cost
shock by altering other margins, such as prices, productivity,
and the quality of care services provided. In addition, we
consider whether the policy had implications for aggregate
employment and firm dynamics (entry and exit).
We leverage the unique natural experiment offered
by the U.K. policy setting, coupled with rich matched
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employer-employee data, including detailed information on
individual hourly wages for the English care home sector. Empirically, we implement a difference-in-differences
with continuous treatment, where we exploit between-firm
variation in exposure to the NLW to identify the effect of the
minimum wage increase on firm-level outcomes over the 12
months following the reform.
The changed minimum wage structure and associated
higher minimum wage for those aged 25 and above significantly impacted wages, but there is much less evidence of
adverse employment effects, and no significant impact on
firm closure nor on entry/exit dynamics more generally one
year after. Rather, the margin of adjustment that was used
was the quality of care services. Care homes bound more
tightly by the NLW exhibited smaller short-run improvements in the quality of care services than less-bound homes.
There is also strong evidence of wage spillovers resulting
from the new minimum wage structure as younger workers’ wages rose in tandem with the higher adult minimum
wage, but with no spillover impact on their employment. We
discuss potential explanations for this pattern of spillovers,
including preferences for pay fairness and administrative
simplicity. The evidence suggests that employers’—rather
than workers’—preferences for fairness play an important
role in within-firm wage-setting policies in the sector that is
studied.
The content of this chapter relates to all of the three
main streams along which the minimum wage literature has
evolved through time. Firstly, the primary focus of this literature has been on the employment and unemployment effects
of minimum wages.15 Secondly—and partly in response to
the fact that, in a number of settings, employment effects
have proven elusive to track down—a smaller but growing
body of research has examined other margins of adjustment
by firms, such as prices, profits, and firm value.16 Thirdly,
another strand of the minimum wage literature has studied
the impact on wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution and at spillover effects up the wage distribution.17
Thanks to a combination of rich data sources and a novel
research setting, we contribute to this literature by providing
a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the NLW introduction on employment and other margins of firm adjustment, as well as new evidence on downward wage spillovers.

Chapter 4
Zero-Hours Contracts and Labor
Market Policy
(with Nikhil Datta and Stephen J. Machin)
Alternative work arrangements, such as independent
contractors, temp agency workers, and contract company
workers, are a growing and increasingly important feature of
2019 Dissertation Summaries

the labor markets of many developed economies. Alternative
work arrangements have been growing not only in selfemployment, but also as an evolution of traditional employment jobs. One such example is ZHCs, whereby workers
agree to be available for work as and when required, with no
guaranteed hours or times of work. In the past 10 years, the
number of workers on ZHCs increased tenfold in the United
Kingdom, reaching one million in 2017. The increased
incidence of this kind of work has led to discussions of
there being a trade-off between additional flexibility and
the emergence of low-wage, dead-end jobs, which function
outside the job legislation offered in conventional forms of
employment. From a research perspective, it is important to
try to determine which side of this trade-off dominates, and if
it differs by work arrangement.
In this chapter, we examine the labor market in the United
Kingdom, where the rise of atypical work has been a key
feature of the post-financial-crisis period. The focus is placed
specifically on one kind of alternative work arrangement
that has increasingly entered the U.K. setting, namely ZHCs.
Almost a million people are on ZHCs at the time of writing,
out of a total workforce of 32 million. Many of these ZHC
work positions are prominent in the low-wage sectors of
employment. Their relevance to labor market policy that
affects low-wage levels is therefore high.
The principal focus of the chapter is placed on developing a better understanding of ZHCs and labor market policy.
In doing this, the chapter has two main aims. The first is to
empirically document the evolution and characterization of
ZHCs in the U.K. setting. There are two parts to this—the
first draws on data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey
and the second on newly collected survey data on alternative
work arrangements. Part of the latter survey is devoted to
ZHCs, which are surveyed and understood only limitedly
in existing survey data sources (Abraham and Amaya 2018)
and, consequently, in the literature, and the intention is to fill
this gap with new evidence.
The second aim is to explore the extent to which labor
market institutions have the scope to be, at least partly,
responsible for the increased diffusion of flexible work
arrangements, or, conversely, whether the latter are a consequence of factors that have little to do with labor market
institutions and rigidities. In this chapter, a particular policy
focus is placed on minimum wages, where we are interested in understanding whether higher minimum wages
have potential to induce a larger utilization of alternative
work arrangements by firms and, consequently, a shift in the
composition of their workforce toward more flexible but also
insecure jobs.
In Europe, the rise of alternative work arrangements
and gig-economy jobs is often considered an expression of
the duality of the labor market, whereby the existence of
rigidities in the ‘primary’ market creates the conditions for
an expansion of more flexible contractual relationships in the
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secondary market. Alternative work arrangements have also
grown in the United States, where labor markets overall are
less rigid than in Europe but where minimum wages are an
important component of labor market policies. By providing
direct evidence on the role—or lack thereof—of minimum
wage policies on the incidence of flexible work arrangements, this chapter contributes to understanding a policy
question relevant to both the United States and European
labor markets.
In the first part of the chapter, survey-based evidence is
presented to show that ZHCs are a key contract type in some
predominantly low-wage, sectors of the U.K. labor market.
Coupled with limited and fragmented hours, such low pay
implies high levels of earnings insecurity. A stark dichotomy
emerges between workers who value the flexibility provided
by ZHC jobs and workers who would rather work more and
more regular hours, and therefore appear to be engaged in
ZHCs out of necessity rather than by choice. ZHCs also
feature, in different guises or by different names, in other
countries’ employment structures.
The second part of the chapter analyzes minimum wage
policy and ZHC utilization by exploiting a substantial
increase in the minimum wage rate for workers aged 25 and
over that took place in the United Kingdom in April 2016,
when a new minimum wage rate—the NLW—was introduced (Bell and Machin 2018; Giupponi and Machin 2018).
In the U.K. setting, ZHC usage by employers does seem to
have been affected by changes in labor market policy, as
the sizable hike of the minimum wage that occurred when
the NLW was introduced did shift more workers onto ZHC
positions in the adult social care sector (and in low-wage
sectors more generally). To our knowledge, this is the first
study connecting minimum wage changes to employers’ use
of different types of job contracts.
Notes
1. Chapter 1: I acknowledge financial support from STICERD
and the sponsors of the VisitINPS program. The findings and
conclusions expressed in this chapter are solely those of the
author and do not represent the views of INPS. Chapter 2: We
acknowledge financial support from ERC Grant No. 679704 DYNAMICSS, the INPS Valeria Solesin Fellowship, ESRC,
STICERD and the sponsors of the VisitINPS program. The
findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the
authors and do not represent the views of INPS. Chapter 3: We
acknowledge financial support from the Low Pay Commission.
Chapter 4: We acknowledge financial support from ESRC
(ESRC Grant No. ES/S000097/1).
2. Entitlement to the benefit is lost upon remarriage. It otherwise
continues until death.
3. In the empirical analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals
aged 55 and under at the time of their spouse’s death.
4. The income effect—or marginal propensity to earn out of
unearned income—is measured as the change in earned
income for a unit change in unearned income.
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5. Program substitution refers to a change in take-up of other
social assistance and social insurance programs (conditional
on eligibility) in response to a change in a given program’s
generosity (Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimüller 2016).
6. See, among others, Robins (1985); Burtless (1986);
Ashenfelter and Plant (1990); Hum and Simpson (1993);
Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001); Akee et al. (2010);
Cesarini et al. (2017); and Jones and Marinescu (2018).
7. On disability insurance, see Bound (1989); French and Song
(2014); Kostol and Mogstad (2014); Autor et al. (2016);
Deshpande (2016a,b); and Autor et al. (2019). On health
insurance, see Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014); on
earned income tax credits, Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Saez
(2010); on retirement wealth, Krueger and Pischke (1992) and
Gelber, Isen, and Song (2016, 2017).
8. See Chetty et al. (2011) for a review of this literature.
9. See Baily (1978); Gruber (1997); Chetty (2006); Shimer and
Werning (2008); Chetty (2008); Landais (2015); Hendren
(2017); Dobkin et al. (2018); Fadlon and Nielsen (2019);
Fadlon, Ramnath, and Tong (2019); and Landais and
Spinnewijn (2019).
10. See Hijzen and Martin (2013) and Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018).
11. U.S. Department of Labor Office (2016).
12. As a matter of example, the German social security administration (IAB) does not collect data on STW. Most STW applications and reports are sent in a paper format to the Federal
Employment Agency and are not digitized. Only a sample of
these reports has been digitized for the Nuremberg metropolitan area for years 2008 to 2010 and matched to IAB data (Tilly
and Niedermayer 2016).
13. In most countries with large STW programs in place, such as
Germany or France, there is no variation in a firm’s eligibility
to take up STW. Most papers therefore rely on the structure of
calibrated models to analyze the effects of STW on workers
and firms (Tilly and Niedermayer 2016; Cooper, Meyer, and
Schott 2017). Other studies instrument STW take-up during
the recession with the prior experience of firms with the program (e.g. Boeri and Brücker 2011; Cahuc and Carcillo 2011;
Hijzen and Martin 2013) and find competing results. Recently,
Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018) offer a credible and
compelling IV strategy in the French context. They instrument
STW take up using the proximity of a firm to other firms having used STW before recessions. They also use as an alternative instrument response time variation in the administrative
treatment of STW applications across French departments.
They find, similar to our results, large and significant employment effects of STW treatment.
14. While a small theoretical literature shows (not surprisingly)
that STW may distort both hours (Burdett and Wright 1989)
and the allocation of workers across firms, thus reducing output (Cooper, Meyer, and Schott 2017), there is no clear view of
the conditions under which STW programs might be socially
desirable and improve welfare.
15. Following an early and mostly U.S.-based time-series work
that found negative employment effects among teenagers
(Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982), starting from the early
1990s quasi-experimental micro-based studies found no
evidence of disemployment effects in the United States and
the United Kingdom (Card and Krueger 1994; Machin,
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Manning, and Rahman 2003; Stewart 2004). A recent revival
of minimum wage research in the US has adopted spatial
identification strategies, also mostly finding it hard to detect
evidence of job cuts due to minimum wages (Dube, Lester, and
Reich 2010, 2016; Baskaya and Rubinstein 2015; Clemens and
Wither 2019). In a rather different context of union bargained
minima, Kreiner, Reck, and Skov (forthcoming) study the
effect of a change in the youth minimum wage in Denmark and
find an employment elasticity to the wage rate of −0.8.
16. On prices, see Aaronson (2001), MaCurdy (2015), and Harasztosi and Lindner (2019); on profits, see Draca, Machin, and
Van Reener (2011); and on stock market values, see Bell and
Machin (2018). Multiple adjustment channels are studied in
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2015), and Harasztosi and
Lindner (2019). Sorkin (2015) emphasizes the distinction
between modes of adjustment in the short and long run.
17. See DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999), and
Autor, Manning, and Smith (2016).
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